The European Crisis and Migration to Germany: Expectations and the Diversion of Migration Flows by BERTOLI, Simone et al.
The European Crisis and Migration to Germany:
Expectations and the Diversion of Migration Flows
Simone Bertoli, Herbert Bru¨cker, Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
To cite this version:
Simone Bertoli, Herbert Bru¨cker, Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga. The European Crisis and
Migration to Germany: Expectations and the Diversion of Migration Flows. 2013.21. 2013.
<halshs-00913869>
HAL Id: halshs-00913869
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00913869
Submitted on 4 Dec 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
C E N T R E  D ' E T U D E S  
E T  D E  R E C H E R C H E S  
S U R  L E  D E V E L O P P E M E N T  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
 
SERIE ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CERDI 
 
 
The European Crisis and Migration to Germany: 
Expectations and the Diversion of Migration Flows 
 
Simone Bertoli, Herbert Brücker, and Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga 
 
Etudes et Documents n° 21 
November 13, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERDI  
65 BD. F. MITTERRAND 
63000 CLERMONT FERRAND - FRANCE 
TEL.  04 73 17 74 00  
FAX  04 73 17 74 28 
www.cerdi.org 
Etudes et Documents n° 21, CERDI, 2013 
 
 
 
The authors 
 
Simone BERTOLI 
Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, CNRS, UMR 6587, CERDI, F-63009 Clermont Fd  
Email: simone.bertoli@udamail.fr  
Corresponding author 
 
Herbert BRÜCKER 
IAB and University of Bamberg 
email: herbert.bruecker@iab.de. 
 
Jesús FERNANDEZ-HUERTAS MORAGA 
FEDEA and IAE, CSIC 
email: jfernandezhuertas@fedea.es. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La série des Etudes et Documents du CERDI est consultable sur le site : 
http://www.cerdi.org/ed 
 
 
 
 
Directeur de la publication : Patrick Plane 
Directeur de la rédaction : Catherine Araujo Bonjean 
Responsable d’édition : Annie Cohade 
ISSN : 2114 - 7957 
 
 
 
 
 
Avertissement :  
Les commentaires et analyses développés n’engagent que leurs auteurs qui restent 
seuls responsables des erreurs et insuffisances. 
 
Etudes et Documents n° 21, CERDI, 2013 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The European crisis has diverted migration flows away from countries affected by the recession 
towards Germany. The diversion process creates a challenge for traditional discrete-choice models 
that assume that only bilateral factors account for dyadic migration rates. This paper shows how 
taking into account the sequential nature of migration decisions leads to write the bilateral migration 
rate as a function of expectations about the evolution of economic conditions in alternative 
destinations. Empirically, we incorporate 10-year bond yields as an explanatory variable capturing 
forward-looking expectations and apply our model to an empirical analysis of migration from the 
countries of the European Economic Association to Germany in the period 2006-2012. We show that 
disregarding alternative destinations leads to substantial biases in the estimation of the 
determinants of migration rates. 
 
Keywords: international migration; multiple destinations; diversion; dynamic discrete choice model; 
expectations. 
JEL classification codes: F22, O15, J61. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The European Crisis and Migration to Germany:
Expectations and the Diversion of Migration Flows
Simone Bertolia, Herbert Bru¨ckerb, and Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moragac
aCERDI∗, University of Auvergne and CNRS
bIAB† and University of Bamberg
cFEDEA‡ and IAE, CSIC
November 13, 2013
Abstract
The European crisis has diverted migration flows away from countries affected by
the recession towards Germany. The diversion process creates a challenge for tradi-
tional discrete-choice models that assume that only bilateral factors account for dyadic
migration rates. This paper shows how taking into account the sequential nature of mi-
gration decisions leads to write the bilateral migration rate as a function of expectations
about the evolution of economic conditions in alternative destinations. Empirically, we
incorporate 10-year bond yields as an explanatory variable capturing forward-looking
expectations and apply our model to an empirical analysis of migration from the coun-
tries of the European Economic Association to Germany in the period 2006-2012. We
show that disregarding alternative destinations leads to substantial biases in the esti-
mation of the determinants of migration rates.
Keywords: international migration; multiple destinations; diversion; dynamic discrete choice model; ex-
pectations.
JEL classification codes: F22, O15, J61.
∗CERDI, Bd. Franc¸ois Mitterrand, 65, 63000, Clermont-Ferrand, France; phone: +33(0)473177514,
email: simone.bertoli@udamail.fr (corresponding author).
†Weddigenstr. 20-22, D-90478 Nuremberg; email: herbert.bruecker@iab.de.
‡Jorge Juan, 46, E-28001, Madrid; email: jfernandezhuertas@fedea.es.
1
1 Introduction
What has been the impact of the economic crisis that began in 2008 on migration in Europe?
The answer to such a question may seem evident, as the asymmetric effects of the crisis upon
different countries have been matched by a transformation of the landscape of migration flows
within Europe, with Spain and Germany representing two polar cases in this respect. Spain,
which had experienced a surge in the share of immigrants in its population from 4 percent in
the late 1990s to 14 percent in 2007 (Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2013), recorded
negative net migration flows in 2011 and 2012 (INE, 2013), while Germany experienced a
substantial increase in net migration flows, which stood at 0.5 percent of its population in
2012 compared to 0.1 percent in the decade before (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013), with
only a minor part of this surge that can be directly traced back to the European countries
which have been more severely affected by the crisis.1 This, in turn, suggests that providing
a convincing answer to our initial question requires to account for the diversion of migration
flows determined by the crisis, as worsening labor market conditions and dismal economic
prospects in some European countries are likely to have induced prospective migrants to
adjust their destination choices. Consider, for instance, Romania, which is the origin country
that experienced the largest increase in gross migration flows to Germany in recent years:
the size of this increase corresponds roughly to the size of the decline in migration flows from
Romania to Spain, as revealed by Figure 1.
The standard econometric approach in the international migration literature is ill-equipped
to answer our research question, as it is based on an underlying modeling of migration as
a forward-looking but permanent decision, which is not adjusted or reversed as the attrac-
tiveness of alternative destinations changes over time, as observed by Kennan and Walker
(2011). The micro-foundation of the decision to migrate rests on the canonical random
utility maximization model (McFadden, 1974, 1978), with the (either implicit or explicit)
assumption that the deterministic component of utility corresponds to “the present value
of expected earnings at destination” (Ortega and Peri, 2013, p. 55). This, in turn, leads to
estimate bilateral migration rates as a function of the differential in current attractiveness
of the destination and of the origin country only, thus greatly constraining the scope for the
1Germany recorded a net immigration flow of 70,000 persons from Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain in
2012, while the corresponding flow from the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe stood
at 190,000 persons (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013).
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existence of diversion effects. If prospective migrants consider the possibility of temporary
migration2 and of making additional moves in the future, then the decision to stay or migrate
today also reflects such an option (Burda, 1995), so that the expectations about the future
attractiveness of alternative destinations could also be influencing current location choices.
Coming back to our example, the expectation of a prolonged period of high unemployment
in Spain might contribute to explain the recent increase in migration flows from Romania to
Germany.
We draw on recent contributions to the economic literature (Artuc¸ et al., 2010; Kennan
and Walker, 2011; Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011) to propose a dynamic discrete choice model
that accounts for the sequential nature of the decisions to migrate, where the determinis-
tic component of utility for each destination in period t depends on the expected value of
the optimal sequence of location choices from period t + 1 onwards. This model, which is
consistent with the forward-looking and path-dependent nature of migration decisions, can
be solved analytically under standard distributional assumptions on the stochastic compo-
nent of utility, but the corresponding choice probabilities differ starkly from those generated
by a canonical RUM model. Specifically, the assumption that the stochastic component
of utility follows and identically and independently distributed Extreme Value Type-1 dis-
tribution (McFadden, 1974) does not allow us to write the logarithm of the odds ratio of
two locations solely as a function of the current attractiveness of the two locations, as the
odds ratio depends also upon the future attractiveness of all alternatives in the choice set,
and on the whole structure of bilateral migration costs. We label this dependency as dy-
namic multilateral resistance to migration, to differentiate it from the one that arises when
introducing more general distributional assumptions on the canonical RUM model (Bertoli
and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2013), which we refer to as static multilateral resistance to
migration.3
We derive the expression for the bias that arises when bilateral migration rates are
estimated only as a function of the characteristics of the origin and of the destination country,
following a long-established tradition in the migration literature (Hanson, 2010). In terms of
our model, this traditional estimation approach can be justified only if we assume either that
2See, inter alia, Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), Dustmann (2003) and
Bru¨cker and Schro¨der (2012) for models of temporary migration.
3Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) show how unobserved individual heterogeneity can be incorporated into
a dynamic RUM model.
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individuals behave myopically, abstracting from the future consequences of current location
choices, or that there are no migration costs.
We demonstrate that the Common Correlated Effects, CCE, estimator proposed by Pe-
saran (2006) allows to control for dynamic multilateral resistance to migration when es-
timating the determinants of bilateral migration flows with aggregate data. Kennan and
Walker (2011) use their dynamic RUM model to estimate the determinants of internal mi-
gration decisions with individual-level longitudinal data, so that a contribution of our paper
is to demonstrate that a sequential model of migration can be estimated with a less data-
demanding approach.4 We adopt the same econometric approach followed by Bertoli and
Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013), so that this is able to remove the bias due to multilat-
eral resistance to migration, irrespective of its dynamic or static origin. In our framework,
we consider explicitly expectations on the time-varying attractiveness of alternative desti-
nations, thus departing from the estimation approaches adopted by Artuc¸ et al. (2010) and
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011).
Our sequential model of migration is used to analyze the determinants of migration flows
from the member states of the European Economic Association, EEA,5 to Germany based on
a high-frequency administrative dataset from January 2006 to December 2012.6,7 This paper
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to explicitly consider how expectations on the
future attractiveness of alternative destinations can lead to a diversion of current migration
flows. The EEA represents an area with unique institutional features, as its legislation favors
the free mobility of workers between its member states, thus facilitating repeated moves by
the migrants. Sequential moves are not consistent with a representation of the location-
decision problem that potential migrants face through a canonical discrete choice model,
4Artuc¸ et al. (2010) also use aggregate data to identify the switching costs that workers in the US face
when changing the sector they are employed in, but their estimation approach does not deal with general
forms of individual unobserved heterogeneity, what we can call static multilateral resistance to migration.
5The EEA encompasses the whole EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway; although Switzerland is
not de jure a member of the EEA, it has ratified a series of bilateral agreements with the EU that allows to
usually regard it as a de facto EEA member state.
6The migration data have a monthly frequency; other papers using monthly or quarterly migration data
in an econometric analysis are Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999), Orrenius and Zavodny (2003) and Bertoli
and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013).
7The CCE estimator has satisfactory small sample properties already for the longitudinal and cross-
sectional dimension of our data according to the Monte Carlo simulations in Pesaran (2006).
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and this strengthens the case for the adoption of the dynamic model of migration decisions
that underpins our estimation approach.
We also provide evidence on the direct role played by expectations on the decision to
migrate by augmenting the vector of determinants of location-specific utility with a forward-
looking variable, which can reflect the expectations about future economic prospects at origin
held by potential migrants. More specifically, we use the yields on the secondary market of
government bonds with a residual maturity of 10 years as a proxy for future economic
conditions. This choice is supported by the evidence that we provide using data from 14
waves of the Eurobarometer survey that concerns about personal job market prospects and
economic conditions in general in the year to come are closely related to the evolution of the
10-year bond yields.8
Our econometric analysis reveals that variations in the unemployment rate at origin sig-
nificantly influence the bilateral migration rate to Germany, but that the size of this effect is
grossly overestimated in standard specifications that do not control for dynamic multilateral
resistance to migration. This bias, whose direction is consistent with the one implied by
our sequential model of migration, is removed once we resort to the CCE estimator, which
reveals that the elasticity of the bilateral migration rate with respect to unemployment at
origin stands at 0.5. We also provide evidence that a 10 percent increase in the 10-year
bond yields at origin is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in the bilateral migration to
Germany, significantly below the (biased) estimate that we get when we do not account for
multilateral resistance to migration. The standard estimation approaches that do not fully
account for the forward-looking and path-dependent nature of the decision to migrate can
produce biased estimates of the determinants of international migration flows. Our estimates
reveal that the bias in the estimated effect of the unemployment rate at origin is not solely
due to its correlation with the domestic future unemployment rate, but also to its correlation
with the future attractiveness of alternative destinations.
This paper is related to four main strands of literature. First, the literature on the de-
terminants of international migration flows (Clark et al., 2007; Pedersen et al., 2008; Lewer
and den Berg, 2008; Mayda, 2010; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Beine et al., 2011; Belot and
8A key feature of this variable is that it certainly belongs to the information set upon which potential
migrants take their decisions, as the media coverage of the yields of 10-year bonds has substantially in-
creased in recent years when the crisis unfolded; Farre´ and Fasani (2013) demonstrate that information on
fundamental economic variables in the media significantly impacts migration decisions.
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Hatton, 2012; Bertoli et al., 2011; Belot and Ederveen, 2012; McKenzie et al., 2013; Beine et
al., 2013), and more specifically to the papers that have relaxed the distributional assump-
tions on the underlying RUM model (Ortega and Peri, 2013; Bertoli et al., 2013; Bertoli and
Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2012, 2013), and those that have analyzed the determinants of
migration to Germany, mainly in the context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement (Vogler and
Rotte, 2000; Boeri and Bru¨cker, 2001; Fertig, 2001; Flaig, 2001; Sinn et al., 2001; Bru¨cker and
Siliverstovs, 2006). Second, the literature on discrete choice models (McFadden, 1974, 1978;
Small and Rosen, 1981; Cardell, 1997; Wen and Koppelman, 2001; Train, 2003; de Palma
and Kilani, 2007). Third, this also paper draws on the papers that have proposed dynamic
discrete choice models (Pessino, 1991; Artuc¸ et al., 2010; Kennan and Walker, 2011; Arcidi-
acono and Miller, 2011; Bishop, 2012; Artuc¸, 2013). Fourth, the literature on the estimation
of linear models with a common factor structure in the error term (Pesaran, 2006; Bai, 2009;
Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a RUM model
that describes the sequential location-decision problem that potential migrants face, and it
derives the equation to be estimated. Section 3 introduces our sample and data sources, and
it provides empirical evidence that supports our reliance on 10-year bond yields as proxies for
the expectations about future economic conditions at origin. Section 4 contains the relevant
descriptive statistics, and Section 5 presents the results of our econometric analysis. Section
6 draws the main conclusions of the paper.
2 A sequential model of migration
We consider a set of agents, each of them denoted by i, located in country j that have to
choose their preferred location from a set of countries D, which includes n elements, for each
period t = 1, ..., T . The expected utility of opting for country k at time t is given by:
Uijkt ≡ wkt − cjk + βVt+1(k) + ǫikt (1)
This depends on (i) a deterministic instantaneous component wkt, (ii) a determinis-
tic time-invariant component cjk that describes the cost of moving from j to k,
9 (iii) the
9We assume that bilateral migration costs are time-invariant, but the model can be readily extended to
allow for an exogenous evolution over time in migration costs.
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discounted value, with time discount factor β ≤ 1, of the expected utility Vt+1(k) from opti-
mally choosing the preferred location from time t+1 onwards conditional upon being in k at
time t, and on (iv) a stochastic individual- and time-specific component ǫikt. For simplicity,
we assume that there is no uncertainty about the evolution over time of the deterministic
component of utility wjt for all j ∈ D,
10 and that potential migrants also know all possible
bilateral migration costs cjk. We also assume that individual i chooses her preferred location
after having observed the realizations of the stochastic component of utility at time t for all
countries, but without any information on their future realizations. This, in turn, explains
why we refer to Uijkt in (1) as expected utility, as Vt+1(k) is a random variable. Notice
that wkt + βVt+1(k) does not represent the present value of expected instantaneous utility
in country k, as the continuation payoff Vt+1(k) also reflects the value of the option to move
away from k at some time s ≥ t+1. Hence, our model differs from a RUM model where the
deterministic component of utility is interpreted as the present value of expected earnings
(or instantaneous utility more generally).11
2.1 The continuation payoff Vt+1(k)
The continuation payoff Vt+1(k) depends on k as individuals located in different countries
can face a different vector of bilateral migration costs. In the absence of migration costs,
then Vt+1(k) = Vt+1 for any location k chosen at time t.
12
We can obtain an analytic expression for the value of the continuation payoff by backward
induction, and introducing distributional assumptions on the stochastic component of utility.
Specifically, let us focus first on VT (k). We have that the continuation payoff for the last
period is given by the inner product of a vector pkT that describes the probability of moving
from k to any location in D at time t = T and of a vector uT that describes the expected
utility from choosing each location in D at time t = T , conditional upon the fact that this
10This assumption is actually unnecessary, as discussed by Artuc¸ et al. (2010).
11Notice that in such a model not only the decision to migrate is permanent, but also the decision to stay
cannot be reversed, as observed by Kennan and Walker (2011).
12Vt+1(k) would still depend on k even in the absence of migration costs if we allowed the time-varying
deterministic component of utility wkt in (1) to vary across individuals and to depend on their past migration
history; this more general version of the model could, for instance, handle a positive return to the time elapsed
since migration, introducing a greater persistence in location choices over time, but would not alter the key
insights from our sequential migration model.
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is the utility-maximizing alternative. Formally:
VT (k) ≡ pkT
′uT
If we assume that the stochastic component of utility follows an independent and iden-
tically distributed EVT-1 distribution (McFadden, 1974), then we have that:
pkT =
(∑
l∈D
ewlT−ckl
)−1
ew1T−ck1
. . .
ewnT−ckn

Furthermore, de Palma and Kilani (2007) demonstrate that these distributional assump-
tions imply that the expected utility does not vary across alternatives, and Small and Rosen
(1981) already provided the analytical expression for the expected value from the choice
situation, so that:
uT =
[
γ + ln
(∑
l∈D
ewlT−ckl
)]
1
where γ is the Euler’s constant and 1 is a n× 1 vector whose elements are all equal to 1.
This allows us to rewrite VT (k) as follows:
13
VT (k) = γ + ln
(∑
l∈D
ewlT−ckl
)
Then, the expected utility from locating in country k at time t = T − 1 can be rewritten
as:
UijkT−1 = wkT−1 − cjk + β ln
(∑
l
ewlT−ckl
)
+ βγ + ǫikt
If we go one more step back, to define the expected continuation payoff for period t =
T − 1, we can observe that:14
13Notice that VT (k) is an increasing and convex function of wlT , for any l ∈ D.
14We rely here on wkT−1 − clk + βVT (k) as the (expected) deterministic component of the attractiveness
of country k at time t = T −1, which includes also the discounted value of the continuation payoff from time
t = T , as in Kennan and Walker (2011).
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VT−1(l) = γ + ln
(∑
k∈D
ewkT−1−clk+βVT (k)
)
More generally, we can rewrite the expression for location-specific utility at time t as
follows:
Uijkt = wkt − cjk + β
[
γ + ln
(∑
l∈D
ewlt+1−ckl+βVt+2(l)
)]
+ ǫikt (2)
2.2 Choice probabilities at time t
The distributional assumptions on the stochastic component entail that the vector of choice
probabilities pkt, for any t = 1, ..., T , can be written as:
pkT =
(∑
l∈D
ewlT−ckl+βVt+1(l)
)−1
ew1T−ck1+βVt+1(1)
. . .
ewnT−ckn+βVt+1(n)

If we take the logarithm of the ratio of the probability to opt for country k over the
probability to stay in country j in period t, then we get:15
ln
(
pjkt
pjjt
)
= wkt − cjk − wjt + β [Vt+1(k)− Vt+1(j)] (3)
The expression in (3) depends on (i) the difference between the deterministic component
of utility at time t in k and in j only, and (ii) on the difference in the discounted value of
the expected continuation payoff from k and j.16
15We normalize the cost of staying in j to zero, i.e., cjj=0; as choice probabilities depend only on the
difference in utility across countries rather than on their levels, the normalization is immaterial.
16Artuc¸ et al. (2010) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) go one step further, and express the difference
between the continuation payoffs Vt+1(k) − Vt+1(j) as a function of future choice probabilities, exploiting
the fundamental result of Hotz and Miller (1993); we do not follow this approach, as we are also interested
in providing direct evidence on the role of expectations in shaping current location decisions; our estimates
on the effect of the unemployment rate at origin are robust to the adoption of their proposed estimation
approach.
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2.3 The standard specification in the literature
A long-standing tradition in the international migration literature is to express the logarithm
of the ratio of the probability to opt for country k over the probability to stay in country
j in period t as depending only on the attractiveness of the two countries (Hanson, 2010).
What are the assumptions that would allow us to rewrite (3) in such a way?
We would need to assume either that (i) individuals take myopic decisions, i.e., β = 0, or
that (ii) there are no migration costs, i.e., cjk = 0 for any j, k ∈ D. Assumption (i) deprives
the continuation payoffs Vt+1(k) and Vt+1(j) in (3) of any relevance for current location
decisions, while assumption (ii) entails that Vt+1(k) = Vt+1(j), so that the solution to the
sequential location decision problem is memoryless, as it is independent from past choices.
Needless to say, either of the two assumptions is highly implausible: assuming that
individuals are myopic is starkly at odds with the representation of migration as a forward-
looking investment decision (Sjaastad, 1962), while the absence of migration costs stands in
sharp contrast with the empirical evidence that the scale of international migration flows
is severely constrained by policy-induced migration costs (Pritchett, 2006; Clemens, 2011;
Mayda, 2010; Ortega and Peri, 2013; Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2012). Hence,
it is important to gain a better understanding of the implications of the dependency of
current location decisions on Vt+1(k) and Vt+1(j).
2.4 The future attractiveness of alternative destinations
Let us rewrite the expression for the continuation payoff Vt+1(k):
Vt+1(k) = γ + ln
(∑
l∈D
ewlt+1−ckl+βVt+2(l)
)
If we derive it with respect to the attractiveness of a country h at time s = t+1, we get:
∂Vt+1(k)
∂wht+1
= pkht+1 (4)
A marginal variation in wht+1 induces a change in the continuation payoff Vt+1(k) that is
equal to the probability of moving from k to h at time t+ 1. We can also observe that:
∂2Vt+1(k)
∂wht+1∂ckh
= −pkht+1(1− pkht+1)
10
The impact on Vt+1(k) of a variation in the attractiveness of destination h at time t+ 1
is larger the lower are the bilateral migration costs from k to h. Similarly, for s = t+ 2, we
have that:17
∂Vt+1(k)
∂wht+1
=
∑
l∈D
∂Vt+1(k)
∂Vt+2(l)
∂Vt+2(l)
∂wht+2
= β
∑
l∈D
pklt+1plht+2 = βπkh(t, t+ 2) (5)
where πkh(t, t + 2) represents the probability of moving from country k at time t to
country h at time t + 2. We can easily generalize (4) and (5) to any time s = t + 1, ...T as
follows:
∂Vt+1(k)
∂whs
= βs−t−1πkh(t, s)
This eventually allows us to write the impact on Vt+1(k) of a permanent variation in the
future attractiveness of country h as follows:
T∑
s=t+1
∂Vt+1(k)
∂whs
=
T∑
s=t+1
βs−t−1πkh(t, s)> 0 (6)
The expression in (6) allows us to compute the impact of a permanent variation of the
attractiveness of country h on the logarithm of the ratio of the choice probabilities at time
t. Specifically, we have that:
T∑
s=t+1
∂ ln (pjkt/pjjt)
∂whs
=
T∑
s=t+1
βs−t [πkh(t, s)− πjh(t, s)] ≷ 0 (7)
The term within the summation is given by the difference in the probabilities of moving
respectively from k and j at time t to h at time s. This, in turn, depends on the probability
of all paths of length s− t that optimally lead an individual i to move from either k or j to
country h. Hence, the sensitivity of current location decisions with respect to a variation in
the future attractiveness of an alternative destination does not depend only on the bilateral
migration costs ckh and cjh, but on the whole structure of bilateral migration costs, as
migrants can make an indirect move from, say, k to h via (at most) s− t− 1 countries. This
also entails that we cannot, in general, sign (7) without imposing a structure on the matrix
of bilateral migration costs.
17Notice that the variation in Vt+1(k) depends on the variation in the expected value of the choice situation
for t+ 2 for all countries in the choice set.
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The partial derivative in (7) allows us to conclude that, unless we are willing to assume
that β = 0 or there are no migration costs, our sequential model of migration is characterized
by multilateral resistance to migration (Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2013), as the
logarithm of the ratio of choice probabilities at time t is sensitive to variations in the future
attractiveness of alternative destinations. This occurs even though we have assumed, as
most of the literature does, that the stochastic component of location-specific utility is i.i.d.
EVT-1: this assumption suffices to make (3) independent from the current attractiveness of
alternative destinations, but this logarithm of the ratio of the choice probabilities remains
dependent on the future attractiveness of alternative destinations. In our model, multilateral
resistance to migration does not arise because of more general distributional assumptions
as in Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013), but rather because we accounted for
the sequential nature of the location-decision problem that individuals face. This is why we
refer to it as dynamic multilateral resistance to migration.
2.5 Estimation
Assume that we have an empirical counterpart for the logarithm of the ratio of the choice
probabilities, and let it be denoted by yjkt. Assume also, as the literature does, that the
deterministic component of the attractiveness of location-specific utility can be expressed as
a linear function of a vector of variables x, so that:
yjkt = α
′ (xjkt − xjjt) + rjkt + ηjkt (8)
where xjkt and xjjt reflect respectively the attractiveness at time t of country k and j for
an individual located in j at time t−1, rjkt = β [Vt+1(k)− Vt+1(j)] is the term that captures
the influence on yjkt on the future attractiveness of all countries, and ηjkt is a well-behaved
error term.
The term rjkt is a non-linear function of the (time-varying) future attractiveness of all
countries belonging to the choice set, and it also depends on the vector of parameters α to
be estimated. We can rely on (7) to provide a linear approximation of rjkt, which can be
expressed as:
rjkt ≈ r˜jk + γjk
′ft (9)
where:
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γjk =

∑T
s=t+1 β
s−t [πk1(t, s)− πj1(t, s)]
. . .∑T
s=t+1 β
s−t [πkn(t, s)− πjn(t, s)]
∣∣∣xjks = x˜jk, ∀k ∈ D
and:
ft =

xj1t − x˜j1
. . .
xjnt − x˜jn

with x˜jk representing the average of the determinants attractiveness of k for individuals
coming from j over the period of analysis, and r˜jk is the dynamic multilateral resistance to
migration term evaluated in correspondence to these average values for all countries. This
approximation of rjkt allows us to rewrite (8) as follows:
yjkt = α
′ (xjkt − xjjt) + r˜jk + γjk
′ft + ηjkt (10)
and it suggests relying, as in Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013), on the
Common Correlated Effect, CCE, estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006) to deal with the
threat to identification posed by multilateral resistance to migration. Specifically, Pesaran
(2006) demonstrates that a consistent estimate of α can be obtained when the common
factors ft are serially correlated and correlated with the vectors xjkt and xjjt from the
estimation of the following regression:
yjkt = α
′ (xjkt − xjjt) + αjkdjk + λjk
′z˜t + ηjkt (11)
where djk are dyadic fixed effects and the vector of auxiliary regressors z˜t is formed by
the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and of all the independent variables. The
consistency of the estimates is established by Pesaran (2006) by demonstrating that λjk
′z˜t
converges in quadratic mean to γjk
′ft as the cross-sectional dimension of the panel goes to
infinity, with the longitudinal dimension being either fixed or also diverging to infinity.18
Section 5 provides further details on the exact specification of the equation that will be
estimated.
18See Eberhardt et al. (2013) for a non-technical introduction to the CCE estimator.
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2.5.1 The standard estimation approach in the literature
What happens if we rely on an estimation approach that does not control for the multilateral
resistance to migration term in (8)? Such a standard approach is going to give rise to a biased
and inconsistent estimate of α, which cannot be interpreted as reflecting the structural
parameters of the underlying RUM model. Specifically, this occurs whenever the current
determinants of the attractiveness of country k and j, xjkt and xjjt, are correlated with the
future attractiveness of the two countries, or of any alternative destination in the choice set.
When the confounding influence of rjkt is not controlled for, so that the multilateral resistance
to migration term ends up in the error term, we have that this correlation determines the
endogeneity of all the elements in the vector of regressors.19
Imagine, for the sake of concreteness, that the attractiveness of a country depends on its
current unemployment rate, and that an increase in the rate of unemployment in country
j is positively correlated with its future level in country j itself, and in some alternative
destinations. In such a case, the estimated coefficient of the unemployment rate is biased
if the confounding influence of multilateral resistance to migration is not controlled for, as
it also reflects the influence of variations in the future attractiveness of some countries on
current location decisions. Clearly, this represents a relevant threat to identification in our
case, as we will be focusing on a set of European countries that also represented relevant
destinations for other countries in the region and that have been experiencing an economic
crisis with relevant shared component over the past few years. In such a case, the direct effect
of, say, a rise in unemployment in Italy on migration flows to Germany can be confounded
by the simultaneous surge of the Spanish unemployment rate, which might have diverted
the flow of Italian migrants from Spain to Germany. Differently from the source of static
multilateral resistance to migration described by Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
(2013), information about the prevailing patterns of correlation in the data does not suffice
to sign the direction of the ensuing bias, unless we are willing to introduce assumptions on
the structure of bilateral migration costs; this is why we write that a persistent worsening in
labor market conditions might have diverted the Italian migration flows towards Germany.20
19The endogeneity due to multilateral resistance to migration implies that the approach proposed by
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) to deal with the non-spherical error term in (8) cannot be applied here, as it rests
on the assumption of the exogeneity of the regressors.
20This ambiguity will disappear in our estimates, where the structure of fixed effects enables us to sign
the expected direction of the bias due to dynamic multilateral resistance to migration irrespective of the
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2.5.2 A focus on expectations
Let us consider the derivative of the logarithm of the ratio of the choice probabilities with
respect to the future attractiveness of the country of origin j:
T∑
s=t+1
∂ ln (pjkt/pjjt)
∂wjs
=
T∑
s=t+1
βs−t [πkj(t, s)− πjj(t, s)] < 0 (12)
As long as migration costs are positive,21 we always have that the probability of staying
in j at time t is higher than the probability of moving to j from any other country, i.e.,
πjj(t, s) > πkj(t, s). This, in turn, allows to conclude that an improvement in the future
attractiveness of country j unambiguously reduces the logarithm of the ratio of the current
probability to migrate from j to k over the corresponding probability of staying in j.
If, at time t, we have data about a vector of variables qjt which is informative about the
attractiveness of the origin country j for s ≥ t + 1, then we could augment the equation to
be estimated (11) with qjt:
22
yjkt = α
′ (xjkt − xjjt) + αjkdjk + φ
′qjt + λjk
′z˜t + ηjkt (13)
While the estimation of (11) allows us to control for the confounding effect of the future
attractiveness of the countries in the choice set on current location choices, the estimation
of (13) would also allow us to directly estimate the influence of the future attractiveness of
the origin country on the current size of bilateral migration flows.
2.5.3 Extensions
The proposed sequential model of migration can be extended in a number of possible di-
rections, which do not alter the main insights for the estimation that we have derived from
it.
First, we could introduce an additional source of uncertainty in the model, beyond the
one represented by the individual-specific stochastic component of utility in (1). Specifically,
we could consider macroeconomic uncertainty, by relaxing the assumption that individuals
structure of bilateral migration costs.
21Recall that we have normalized cjj to zero, for any j ∈ D.
22Similarly, we can augment with qjt the standard specification, which does not control for multilateral
resistance to migration.
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know the evolution of the attractiveness of each country in the choice set. If we treat wks,
with s = t + 1, ..., T and k ∈ D as a random variable, then the expected value of the
continuation payoff Vs(k) would be computed as an integral over the whole distribution of
the future attractiveness of the n countries.
Second, we could follow Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) and Bishop (2012), generalizing
the distributional assumptions on the stochastic component of utility in (1) along the lines of
Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013).23 This would, in turn, imply that the loga-
rithm of the ratio of the choice probabilities in (3) would also become sensitive to the current,
and not just to the future, attractiveness of alternative destinations, thus combining in a
single model both what we called static and dynamic multilateral resistance to migration.24
3 Sample composition and data sources
This section describes the sample of origin countries included in our analysis, together with
the data sources for the migration data and for the other variables.
3.1 Sample
The sample of origin countries included in our analysis is composed by all member states of
the European Economic Association, EEA, plus Switzerland. The EEA includes all member
states of the European Union, EU, together with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, and
it represents an area of free mobility of labor.25 It also extends to Switzerland, which has
not joined the EEA but has signed de facto equivalent bilateral agreements with the EU.26
The only exceptions are represented by Liechtenstein and Malta, as the migration data that
we use do not provide figures on migration flows from Liechtenstein to Germany, and the
23For instance, the literature on discrete choice models provides us with an analytical expression for the
continuation payoff Vt+1(k) when the distributional assumptions on ǫikt give rise to a nested logit model
(Train, 2003).
24Both types of multilateral resistance to migration call for the same estimation approach to handle them,
as discussed in Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013) and in Section 2.5 above.
25See Part III of the Agreement of the European Economic Area, Official Journal No. L 1, January 3,
1994, and later amendments.
26See http://eeas.europa.eu/switzerland/index en.htm (last accessed on December 12, 2012); we will at
times slightly abuse the legal definitions, referring to the EEA as if it also includes Switzerland.
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series for Malta contains some zero entries.27 This sample includes 28 countries of origin,
slightly below the threshold of 30 for which Pesaran (2006) provides Monte Carlo evidence
on the correct size of the CCE estimator. This is why, as a robustness, we also consider
an extended sample including two major non-EEA countries of origin, namely Turkey and
Croatia, whose citizens do not benefit from the same rules concerning free mobility.28
3.2 Data sources
3.2.1 Migration data
The data on gross migration inflows are provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013).29 The Federal Statistical Office reports monthly data series
on arrivals of foreigners by country of origin since January 2006.30 We use all the observations
that are currently available, namely from January 2006 until December 2012, which gives us
84 monthly observations for each one of the countries in our sample.
The German migration figures are based on the population registers kept at the mu-
nicipal level. Registration is mandatory in Germany, as stated by the German registration
law approved in March 2002 (“Melderechtsrahmengesetz”).31 This law prescribes that each
individual has to inform the municipality about any change of residence. The law does not
subordinate the need to register to a minimum duration or to the scope of the stay, though
there are exceptions for foreign citizens whose intended duration of stay in Germany is below
two months, so that tourists do not have to register.32 Figures are reported separately for
German and foreign citizens. Foreigners are defined as all individuals who do not possess the
27As we weight observations by population at origin in our estimates, the exclusion of these two countries
from the sample is immaterial, as they jointly represent less than 0.1 percent of the population of the EEA.
28Turkish immigrants represent the largest migrant community in Germany, but total inflows have been
rather moderate in recent years; Croatia is, together with Serbia, the main migrant-sending country among
former Yugoslavian countries, but recent inflows have been also relatively modest.
29This is the same data source as in OECD (2012).
30The country of origin is defined as the country where an individual was resident before moving to
Germany.
31The data are collected at the end of each month and reported about six weeks later by the municipalities
to the local statistical offices of the Federal States and to the Federal Statistical Office; see Statistisches
Bundesamt (2010) for an in-depth outline of this dataset.
32Further exceptions are allowed for diplomats or foreign soldiers and their relatives who do not have to
register.
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German citizenship according to Article 116(1) of the German constitutional law (“Grundge-
setz”), which also encompasses stateless persons. The inflows of the so-called ethnic Germans
(“Spa¨taussiedler”) are reported together with the inflows of German citizens.
This administrative data source provides us with an accurate information on bilateral mi-
gration flows to Germany, as migrants have an incentive to register, and municipalities also
have an incentive to accurately update their population registers.33 Specifically, registration
is a necessary precondition to obtain the income tax card that is required to sign any employ-
ment contract,34 including for seasonal work, and to issue an invoice if self-employed.35 Also,
landlords usually require a proof that their would-be tenants have registered. Furthermore,
the municipalities have an incentive to record new residents properly since their tax revenues
depend on the number of registered inhabitants, so that fees are levied against the persons
who do not comply with the mandatory registration.36
This data source gives us 28×84 = 2, 352 observations for our main sample, with inflows
representing 62.5 percent of total gross inflows of migrants to Germany over our seven-year
period of analysis.
3.2.2 Other variables
We draw the information on the mid-year size of the population at origin, which is used
for defining our dependent variable37 and to weight the observations in our sample, from
33Notice that the same immigrant might be recorded in the data more than once in case of repeated
migration episodes.
34The limited incidence of informal employment in Germany suggests that the number of illegal migrants
not covered by this administrative data source is likely to be small, and all the more so for the origin countries
included in our sample since the main irregular communities are estimated to come from Turkey, Afghanistan
and Iraq. No EEA country is among the top ten of the largest irregular communities according to these
estimates (Schneider, 2012; Vogel and Assner, 2011).
35The self-employed also need to register in order to set up an address for their firm.
36The administrative data also contain information on monthly outflows of foreigners, based on cancelation
from the local population registers; these are less reliable than inflow data, as migrants have fewer incentives
to de-register upon departure.
37As it is common in the literature, this the logarithm of the ratio between the gross flow of migrants
from j to k at time t over the size of the total population at origin at time t; this definition drives a wedge
with the theoretical model, as the denominator of the ratio should actually be represented by the portion
of the population that chose to stay at origin at time t, while the total population also includes immigrants
and returnees. We provide evidence below that this proxy of the theoretically relevant concept does not
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World Bank (2013) and from EUROSTAT (2013c). The latter data source also provides
information on the size of the population by five-year age cohorts, that we will use to perform
some robustness checks on our estimates.
The location-specific expected utility corresponding to the country of origin is explicitly
modeled as a function of (various lags) of the unemployment rate, GDP per capita and the
yields on 10-year government bonds.38 Furthermore, the econometric analysis allows the
bilateral migration rate to Germany to depend also on relevant immigration policy variables
and on a number of dyadic factors that are controlled for but whose effects are not identified
(see Section 5).
The data for the monthly rate of unemployment for all countries in the sample but
Switzerland come from EUROSTAT (2013b), while the Swiss unemployment rate were ob-
tained from Statistik Schweiz (2010). The series, which are based on the ILO definition of
unemployment, are seasonally adjusted. The data for real quarterly GDP are derived from
the International Financial Statistics of the IMF (2013); when the original series are not
seasonally adjusted, we adjust them following the method proposed by Baum (2006). We
rely on population figures from World Bank (2013) to obtain real GDP per capita series.
The third key variable in our analysis is represented by the yields on the secondary
market of government bonds with a residual maturity of 10 years. For EU countries, the
primary data source is represented by the European Central Bank, with the ECB series
being available at EUROSTAT (2013a) and the OECD (2013). We complemented these
data sources with data from National Central Banks. The ECB does not provide 10-year
bond yields figures for Estonia, as the country has a very low public debt financed with
bonds of a shorter maturity.39 To fill this gap in the data, we have regressed the 10-year
bond yields on a linear transformation of the sovereign ratings from Fitch (2013), and used
the estimated coefficients from this auxiliary regression to predict the 10-year bond-yields
for Estonia.40 As a robustness check, we also exclude Estonia from the sample, to ensure
influence our estimates. See also Section 5 for a discussion on this point.
38All the independent variables have been collected since January 2005, as we will be using an optimally
selected number of lags for the independent variables.
39The ECB states that “there are no Estonian sovereign debt securities that comply with the definition of
long-term interest rates for convergence purposes. No suitable proxy indicator has been identified.” (source:
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html, last accessed on December 12, 2012).
40The estimation of the relationship between 10-year bond yields and sovereign ratings includes country
fixed effects; still, the inclusion of origin dummies in our analysis of the determinants of migration flows
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that the imputation of the 10-year bond yields does not affect our estimates.41
Finally, we defined two dummy variables for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to
the EU in January 2007, and for the concession of free movement of labor to Germany in
May 2011 to the citizens of eight countries that accessed the EU in 2004,42 and that had been
subject to transitional agreements that partly limited their right to work in other member
states.
3.3 Ten-year bond yields and expectations
The yields that prevail on the secondary market for government bonds with a residual matu-
rity of 10 years represent a usual focal point along the curve that relates yields to maturity,
which is commonly reported in the media and plays a key role in European treaties.43 Dif-
ferentials in bond-yields within the EEA, and in particular within the Eurozone, are mainly
caused by fiscal vulnerabilities,44 and by the perceptions about the risk of default, the liq-
uidity in the sovereign bonds markets and the time-varying risk preferences of investors
(Barrios et al., 2009).45 Movements in the spreads can have significant consequences, as a
rise in sovereign yields tend to be accompanied by a widespread increase in long-term in-
terest rates faced by the private sector (the so-called sovereign ceiling effect), affecting both
investment and consumption decisions. On the fiscal side, higher government bond yields
entails that we do not use between-country variability for identification, so that the level of the predicted
Estonian bond yields is actually irrelevant.
41The same procedure has been used to predict 10-year bond yields for the two countries in our extended
sample, as bond-yields were missing for Turkey in 2005 and for Croatia over the whole period.
42Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia; Cyprus
and Malta also joined the EU in 2004, but the right to the free movement of labor was granted to the citizens
from these two countries without any transitional periods.
43The Article 121 of the Treaty establishing the European Community states that “the durability of
convergence achieved by the Member State and of its participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the
European Monetary System being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels” (Official Journal of the
European Communities C 325/33, December 24, 2002), and the European Central Bank gathers harmonized
data on 10-year bonds to assess convergence on the basis of Article 121.
44In general, the yields of the 10-year government bonds reflect (i) the expectations about future interest
rates, (ii) inflation and (iii) the risk premium required by the investors; in what follows, we implicitly assume
that point (iii) is driving the evolution, across time and space, of the 10-year bond yields in the EEA.
45For the broad literature which analyses the economic determinants of the spread in interest rates see,
inter alia, von Hagen et al. (2011), Bernoth and Erdogan (2010) and Caggiano and Greco (2012).
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imply higher debt-servicing obligations when the debt is rolled over (Caceres et al., 2010),
which can, in turn, induce the implementation of austerity programs to stabilize debt ratios
that can further depress economic conditions (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).
This is why we can presume that the evolution of the 10-year bond yields can be correlated
with the evolution of the expectations held by the citizens about the future economic outlook
of their own country, which can, in turn, influence their decisions to migrate.
3.3.1 The Eurobarometer survey
The hypothesis that 10-year government bond yields capture individual expectations on
personal economic prospects is proved here based on the Eurobarometer surveys. The Eu-
robarometer surveys are based on approximately 1,000 interviews conducted in European
countries twice a year since 1973.46 We selected the waves and the countries corresponding
to the sample of countries that we use in our main econometric analysis.
We thus drew the data from all the 14 waves of the Eurobarometer survey conducted
between the Spring 2006 and the Fall 2012 in 27 countries.47 We focused on the question:
“what are your expectations for the year to come: will [next year] be better, worse or the
same, when it comes to your personal job situation?”, and we analyzed the determinants of
the share of respondents who expect their job situation to worsen over the next year. Notice
that the data from the survey cannot be directly used in the estimation of the determinants
of bilateral migration rates, as they have a lower frequency than the other variables and they
do not cover all the countries in our sample.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the 14 waves of the Eurobarometer survey
for the 27 countries listed above.48 There is notable variability across countries in the share
of respondents that expect their personal job situation to worsen over the next year, varying
from an average of 2.9 percent for Denmark to 26.7 percent for Hungary. Interestingly,
46The exceptions with respect to the sample size are represented by Germany (1,500 individuals), Lux-
embourg (600) and United Kingdom (1,300).
47The countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Iceland is
included only since 2010, while two countries in our sample (Norway and Switzerland) are not covered by
the Eurobarometer survey.
48German data are not used in the analysis, which is restricted to the 26 origin countries that belong to
our sample.
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Germany is the country that experienced the largest decline in this share between the first
(April 2006) and the last wave (November 2012) of the survey, down from 12 to 5 percent.
All other countries but five experienced an opposite pattern, with the share of respondents
who expressed their concern that increased by as much as 27 percentage points in Greece.49
As expected, although there are differences across countries, Table 1 delivers the image of the
European dimension of the crisis. Importantly, the correlation in economic conditions across
the countries in our sample creates a threat to the econometric analysis of the determinants
of bilateral migration flows to Germany that is discussed in Section 2 and addressed by our
identification strategy.
Needless to say, we do not claim that a simple multivariate analysis can unveil a causal
relationship between the expectations about the future labor market conditions and the
interest rate on the sovereign rate bond, as the latter may well respond to concerns about
the economic perspectives of a country. What we are interested in is to uncover whether
the interest rate on 10-year government bonds is positively associated with expectations on
the future labor market conditions, even after controlling for current economic conditions,
as reflected by the gross domestic product and the level of unemployment at the time of the
survey.
We first regressed the (logarithm of the) share of respondents that expect their personal
job situation to worsen the next year over the (logarithm of the) unemployment rate in
the month of the survey, including also country and time fixed effects.50 This implies that
the coefficients are identified only out of the variability over time within each country, and
they are not influenced by time-varying factors that uniformly influence expectations across
European countries.51
The results are reported in the first data column of Table 2, and they suggest that
a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.53 percent increase
49Notable increases in the share of respondents concerned about their future personal job situation are
recorded also for Cyprus (25 percentage points), Hungary (11), Ireland (14), Italy (11), Portugal (16) and
Spain (12).
50The choice of the functional form of the equation has been informed by the choice with respect to
the specification of the equation that describes the determinants of bilateral migration rates to Germany,
presented in Section 5; notice that we do not have access to individual-level data, which would have justified
to the adoption of alternative econometric models, such as an ordered probit.
51The adjusted R2 of the regression of the dependent variable on the country and time fixed effects stands
at 0.802.
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in the share of respondents who expect a worsening of their personal job situation in the
year to come. The second specification adds the (logarithm of the) interest rate on 10-year
government bonds that prevails on the secondary market among the regressors: a 1 percent
increase in the interest rate is associated with a 0.42 percent increase in the dependent
variable, with the effect being significant at the 1 percent confidence level, while the estimated
elasticity with respect to unemployment falls to 0.27. The elasticity of the expectations about
the future personal job situation with respect to the interest rate is virtually unaffected when
we also add the (logarithm of the) level of gross domestic product at the time of the survey
to the set of regressors.
The results reported here do not depend on the specific question that we selected from
the Eurobarometer survey:52 a positive association with the yields of 10-year bonds emerges
when use of the answers to any of the other four questions concerning the expectations for
the year to come: (i) your life in general; (ii) the economic situation of your country; (iii)
the financial situation of your household, and (iv) the employment situation in your country.
These additional results are reported in Tables A.1-A.2 in the Appendix.
These results provide support to the hypothesis that the current interest rate on the public
debt is informative about the expectations on the evolution of the economic conditions in
one’s own country, which might, in turn, influence the decision to migrate in a dynamic
model such as the one presented in Section 2.
4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for our main sample of origin countries with respect
to the rate of migration, unemployment, real GDP per capita and the 10-year bond yields.
The average monthly migration rate per 1,000 inhabitants over our period of analysis stands
at 0.083 throughout the sample period, with a standard deviation of 0.12. We also report
an index of the migration rate, which is normalized to 100 in January 2006, to give an idea
of its evolution over our seven-year period of analysis: Table 3 reveals the variability of this
index, which ranges between 16.67 and 1,979.68.
The unemployment rate at origin ranges between 2.3 and 26.2 percent, and the associ-
52Results are also robust to clustering the standard errors by country, and to a weighting of the estimates
to reflect the differences in the sample sizes across countries.
23
ated index reveals that some countries have experienced a three-fold increase in the rate of
unemployment since January 2006, while others reduced it by more than 50 percent. The
variability in the unemployment rate is larger than the variability in quarterly real GDP per
capita, with the index ranging between 81.03 and 129.89. The 10-year bond yields stand, on
average, at 4.65 percent, but this average figure hides considerable variability across both
time and space. Specifically, when we normalize bond yields to 100 in January 2006, we ob-
serve that the index ranges between a minimum of 24.62 and a maximum of 812.22, reflecting
the diverging conditions of sovereign bond markets within the EEA in recent years.
4.1 Migration flows
Figure 2 displays gross inflows of migrants to Germany from all origin countries in the world,
together with the inflows from our main sample of 28 EEA countries and with the inflows
from the extended sample of 30 countries. Total gross immigration was nearly constant at
around 600,000 per year between 2006 and 2009, and it then recorded a 60 percent increase
up to 2012, when total inflows stood at around 965,000. Most of the observed variation in
due to migration flows from EEA countries, which increased from 389,000 in 2009 to 645,000
in 2012. This implies that the countries in our main sample, which represent 62.5 percent of
the inflows over our period of analysis, accounted for around 80 percent of the surge between
2009 and 2012. The main country of origin is represented by Poland (976,341 migrants over
the period), followed by Romania (453,719) and Bulgaria (229,202). Some of the countries
that have been more severely hit by the crisis have been climbing up the list of the main
countries of origin, with Italy ranking fifth (174,592 migrants), Greece sixth (103,649) and
Spain seventh (102,166).53
Our administrative data source also allows us to have an (imperfect) idea of the evolution
over time of the stock of immigrants from each origin, a variable that is usually relied upon in
the literature as a proxy for the effect of migration networks (Beine et al., 2011). Specifically,
we can infer the monthly evolution of bilateral migration stocks by relying on the inflows and
outflows data from Statistisches Bundesamt (2013); this gives us an upper bound of the actual
evolution of the stock as we do not account for the reduction in stocks due to deaths and the
53For instance, although the total inflows from Greece are just 10.6 percent of the inflows from Poland
over the period, Polish migration to Germany increased by 24,624 migrants between 2006 and 2012, while
the corresponding increase in Greek migration stands at 25,920.
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administrative data are likely to under record outflows. Migration stocks remained relatively
stable between 2006 and 2012 for origin countries with a long-established migration history to
Germany, such as Italy and Greece.54 Bilateral migration stocks grew more rapidly for other
origin countries, such as Poland (232,351), Romania (152,354). Bulgaria (92,719), Hungary
(68,373) and Spain (34,643), as the difference between inflows and outflows amounted to 23
to 40 percent of total inflows.
5 Estimates
In this section, we present the estimates for several specifications of equation (11), where
the dependent variable yjkt is given by the logarithm of the ratio between gross bilateral
monthly flows to Germany from the country j and the size of the population at origin. We
show two sets of estimates for each specification. The first is consistent only under the
restrictive assumptions on the sequential migration model that imply that the multilateral
resistance to migration term rjkt is identically equal to zero. In other words, it represents
just a classical fixed effects (denoted FE) specification:
yjkt = α
FE
1
′
xjkt +α
FE
2
′
xjjt + α
FE
jk djk +α
FE
t
′
dt + η
FE
jkt (14)
The second one is the unrestricted estimation of equation (13), denoted by CCE, that
is consistent even when we account for the forward-looking and path-dependent nature of
migration decisions, and that controls for a linear approximation of the rjkt term through
the inclusion of a vector of auxiliary regressors, as discussed in Section 2.5:
yjkt = α
CCE
1
′
xjkt +α
CCE
2
′
xjjt + α
CCE
jk djk +α
CCE
t
′
dt + λjk
′z˜t + η
CCE
jkt (15)
Our three potential variables of interest, included in the vector xjjt, which describes the
utility of staying at home, are: the 10-year bond yield on sovereign debt,55 the unemployment
rate and the real GDP index of country j. All three variables enter the equation in logs.
54The difference between the total inflows of Italian and Greek immigrants over the period and the
recorded number of outflows stands at 16,659 and 8,953 respectively, less than 10 percent of total gross
inflows for the two countries between 2006 and 2012.
55Given the inclusion of German (time) fixed effects, this is equivalent to including the spread and we use
both terms interchangeably.
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As outlined in Section 3.3, bonds yields are our measure of expectations on future earnings
or, more generally, on the evolution of the economy of country j. The unemployment rate
and the real GDP index are proxies for the current economic conditions in country j. Both
affect employment opportunities and individual earnings. Since the unemployment rate and
the real GDP index are highly correlated, we expect that multicollinearity may affect our
estimation results.56 We thus start with a more parsimonious specification taking 10-year
bond yields and the unemployment rate as main explanatory variables, and consider them
in addition to the real GDP index in a more comprehensive specification of the model.57
Although we are focusing on migration flows within the EEA where labor mobility is
subject to few restrictions, we can expect some lag between changes in economic conditions
or in expectations about future economic conditions and their effect on migration flows to
Germany. In order to choose the empirically relevant number of lags, we follow Canova
(2007) and select the optimal number of lags by running successive LR tests on dropping
higher order lags.58 The result is that we include four lags of these three variables in our
monthly data regressions. What we report below is the long-run coefficient associated to
each specification, that is, the sum of the lags for each of the variables.
We control for a very wide variety of other determinants of bilateral migration rates in
our specifications. First, we include time fixed effects (dt). They will absorb any German-
specific variation in the data as well as common elements across countries of origin over
time. For example, the effect of current German economic conditions or German general
migration policies is absorbed by our time fixed effects. Importantly, they also absorb the
influence of the continuation payoff Vt+1(k) on yjkt. This, in turn, entails that we can form
expectations on the sign of the bias due to dynamic multilateral resistance to migration,
conditional upon the prevailing patterns of correlation in the data. Specifically, the derivative
56Once we partial out the two variables removing the fixed effects included in the estimation, the corre-
lation between the two variables stands at -0.60.
57There is also a second reason why we do not include the real GDP index in our first specification, as
GDP data are available only at the quarterly level while we try to exploit the monthly variation in order
to improve the precision of our estimates; as it can be seen in the summary statistics from Table 3, there is
much fewer variability to exploit from a quarterly variable: the standard deviation of the normalized version
of the variable is six to seven times lower than the standard deviation of the same normalized version of the
unemployment rate.
58As suggested by Canova (2007), the highest number of lags that we included was T 1/3 ≈ 4, as T = 84
in our dataset; both the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria select the same number of lags.
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in (6) tells us that an increase in the future attractiveness of an alternative destination
unambiguously increases the continuation payoff from staying at origin at time t, Vt+1(j),
thus unambiguously reducing yjkt once we control for Vt+1(k).
59 If, say, an increase in
the unemployment rate at origin is positively correlated with a reduction in the future
attractiveness of some alternative destinations, this would determine an upward bias in the
estimated coefficient for unemployment rate in (14), where we do not control for multilateral
resistance to migration.
Second, we include origin-specific fixed effects (djk) in (14) and (15). These are introduced
to control for time-invariant bilateral determinants of migration flows to Germany from a
given origin. Some examples are cultural, linguistic and geographical distance, common
membership in institutions that did not change over the period, and so on.
Third, our origin-specific fixed effects (djk) also partly control for slowly moving bilateral
or origin-specific variables, such as the demographic composition of the population at origin.
Dyadic fixed effects can also partly control for some time-varying bilateral variables, such as
migration networks, for the origin countries, such as Italy, Greece and Portugal, for which
these remained relatively stable over our seven-year period of analysis, as discussed in Section
4.1. As our data only provide us with an imperfect measure of the evolution of bilateral
migration stocks, we follow Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013) by controlling
for networks through the inclusion of interactions between the dyadic fixed effects djk and
dummies for sub-periods of our seven years in one of our robustness checks.60
Fourth, we control for two major changes in bilateral migration policies that took place
during the sample period (xjkt). First, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU on January 1,
2007. Although Germany did not immediately grant the free movement of workers to citizens
from Bulgaria and Romania, EU membership opens numerous channels to access Germany:
the freedom of settlement enables individuals to move to Germany as self-employed or small
business owners. Moreover, the opportunities for seasonal work, contract work and the
posting of workers have been extended in the context of EU enlargement. Finally, Germany
granted persons with a university degree from the new EU member states access to its labour
market. Thus, accession to the EU facilitated immigration from Bulgaria and Romania
considerably albeit Germany decided to postpone the full application of the rules for the
59The ambiguity would remain if we did not control for Vt+1(k), as shown in (7).
60Specifically, we will introduce interactions between djk and dummies for halves (3 years and 6 months)
and fourths (1 year and 9 months) of our sample.
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free movement of workers until January 1, 2014. The second major policy change was the
introduction of the free movement of workers in May 1, 2011 for the eight Central and Eastern
European member states which joined the EU in 2004. Germany did not only introduce the
free movement of workers on May 1, 2011, but abrogated also the remaining restrictions for
service trade including the posting of workers, which may have further facilitated immigration
from the eight Central and Eastern European member states. Immigration conditions for
third-country nationals, i.e. citizens of non-EU and non-EEA countries, have remained by
and large unchanged during the sample period. The new German immigration law became
effective in 2005, and the 2009 amendment of this law involved only some incremental changes
in channels that have been quantitatively negligible.
Notice again that our origin specific fixed effects (djk) control for migration determinants
such as visa policies which are time-invariant during the sample period, while our time fixed
effects (dt) control for general German migration policies that are not origin-specific.
Finally, we also control for country-specific seasonal effects in the data in our monthly
specifications (also included in xjkt). The monthly flows we study present obvious seasonal
patterns but that vary across origin countries. While the inclusion of these controls does
not affect our results, they improve the fit of the models that we present. Thus, we add
origin-country times month-of-the-year fixed effects to absorb these origin-specific seasonal
patterns.
The rich structure of fixed effects that we rely upon for the estimation of both (14) and
(15) implies that the identifying variation comes from the correlation between the origin-
specific evolution of the seasonally adjusted dependent variable and of the seasonally adjusted
regressors, net of common time effects.61
5.1 Main specifications
As a first step, we present what we can term as a classical fixed effects specification in which
the log of the migration rate from a given European country to Germany is regressed on our
set of controls plus a variable that proxies for current economic conditions in that country:
its unemployment rate. In all specifications, we weight observations by the population of
61The inclusion of interactions between dyadic dummies and dummies for time sub-periods in some
specifications further reduces the identifying variation, removing the variability across sub-periods from each
origin.
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the origin country.62 The results are shown in Column (1) of Table 4. The interpretation of
the long-run coefficient is straightforward: a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate at
origin is associated with a 0.73 percent increase in the emigration rate to Germany.63 The
policy variables are also remarkable. The 2011 free mobility extension was associated with
an increase in the migration rate to Germany of 17 percent whereas the migration rate from
Romania to Bulgaria after 2007 more than quadrupled (312 percent increase).
However, our theoretical model suggests that the estimation of these coefficients is likely
to be biased by the existence of multilateral resistance to migration. The dynamic nature of
the decision to migrate implies that the continuation payoffs Vt+1(k) and Vt+1(j), contained
in rjkt in equation (8), matter for the decision to migrate from an origin j to a destination k
at time t. Given that our dataset only includes one destination, Germany, the continuation
payoff from choosing Germany is controlled for through our time dummies dt in equation
(14), while this is not the case for the continuation payoff Vt+1(j) from choosing the origin
country.
Thus, as long as the unemployment rate at origin is correlated with the future evolution
of the unemployment rate in the origin country itself and in any of all possible destinations,
the coefficient α̂FE will be upward biased.64 As we discussed in Section 2.3, the bias due
to dynamic multilateral resistance to migration would disappear only if we were willing
to introduce the (admittedly implausible) assumption that either individuals take myopic
migration decisions or that we live in a world with no migration costs.
We add the vector of auxiliary regressors z˜t to the specification presented in Column (2)
of Table 4 in order to remove the bias that arises in the presence of multilateral resistance
to migration both of the static and of the dynamic nature.65 The value of the F -test on
62This is the theoretically relevant specification since it ensures that the location decision of each individual
is weighted in the same way, independently of her country of origin. Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
(2013) or Hanson and McIntosh (2012), among others, follow this approach.
63Our estimate is not directly comparable with the one in Beine et al. (2013), which has a larger magnitude,
as they model location-specific utility as depending on the logarithm of the employment (as opposed to the
unemployment) rate, and their estimation strategy does not allow to recover the parameters of the underlying
RUM model (Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2012).
64Notice that it would also be incorrect, as discussed in Section 2.1, to interpret this coefficient as identi-
fying the influence on the bilateral migration rate at time t of a variation in the present value of the expected
stream of instantaneous utility at origin, as the individuals who decide to stay at origin at time t still retain
the option to migrate at a later time.
65For this specification, this requires to estimate 196 additional coefficients, corresponding to 28 origin-
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the assumption that the CCE term is zero is 33.71, thus strongly rejecting the null that
reflects the hypothesis that rjkt is identically zero for all observations. The rejection of the
null confirms the need to control for multilateral resistance to migration,66 thus suggesting
that the estimated elasticity for the unemployment rate in Column (1) is biased. This is
what the comparison of the estimates in Column (1) and (2) actually reveals: the long-run
elasticities of migration rates to Germany with respect to origin-country unemployment rates
go down from 0.73 to 0.52, a 29 percent reduction that signals that the FE estimate was
upward biased. The direction of the bias is, in turn, consistent with a prevailing pattern of
positive correlation in the evolution of the unemployment rate across the countries in the
EEA, which could generate a static multilateral resistance to migration bias and, over time,
also a dynamic multilateral resistance to migration bias. Column (2) provides a consistent
estimate of the effects of unemployment rates at origin on migration rates to Germany67
even if we have omitted relevant observable or unobservable characteristics. Unfortunately,
although we include the policy variables as well, we do not have enough variation in the
data as to distinguish their coefficients from those of the auxiliary CCE regressors,68 so we
cannot test our expectation on them.
The estimates in Column (2) are already free from the threat to identification posed by
the dynamic multilateral resistance to migration, but it is also interesting per se to gain an
understanding of the role played by expectations in the decision to migration to Germany,
rather than just treating them as a nuisance. Thus, we add (various lags of) the yields on
sovereign bonds with a residual maturity of 10 years to our vector of regressors. The results,
specific coefficients for each of the seven auxiliary regressors.
66All of our results are robust to the exclusion of the policy variables from all specifications. In particular,
the F -test still clearly rejects the null if policy variables are excluded or when cross-sectional averages of the
policy variables are not included among the auxiliary regressors. Results available from the authors upon
request.
67While we cannot purely establish causality, the endogeneity generated by reverse causality between
changes in migration rates at the monthly level and changes in unemployment is likely to be irrelevant for
most countries in the sample, given that migration rates to Germany do not generally affect great shares of
the origin population.
68This is due to the fact that all changes in each of the two variables happen simultaneously, in January
2007 and in May 2011, respectively. This, in turn, implies that the variables for all the countries for which we
have a policy change are perfectly collinear with the associated auxiliary regressors. Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-
Huertas Moraga (2013) are able to identify the effect of policy changes with the CCE estimator because they
have variations in the visa variable at different points in time.
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corresponding to the FE and CCE estimation, are presented in Columns (3)-(4) of Table 4.
The estimates in the third data column reveal that a 10 percent increase in bond yields
at origin is associated with a 3.9 percent increase in the bilateral migration rate to Germany.
Interestingly, although the inclusion of our proxy for expectations should not be able to
fully remove the bias due to multilateral resistance to migration, the estimated coefficient
for the unemployment rate stands at 0.53, in line with the CCE estimates in Column (2) and
significantly below the (biased) coefficient in Column (1).69 This allows us to speculate that,
in this particular dataset, the bias induced by dynamic multilateral resistance to migration
might be more relevant than that induced by static multilateral resistance to migration.
The estimate of the coefficient on the 10-year bond yields in Column (3) is biased, as
the FE specification, which does not fully control for multilateral resistance to migration,
confounds the direct effect of a worsening in expectations at origin with the indirect effects
due to a simultaneous worsening in the expectations for some alternative destinations. For
instance, a positive correlation between the evolution of the bond yields for Italy and Spain
would induce an upward bias in the estimated coefficient for the 10-year bond yields, as the
worsening in the expectations for Spain reduces the continuation payoff Vt+1(j) for stayers
in Italy, thus indirectly increasing their incentives to move to Germany at time t.
Once we resort to the CCE estimation, Column (4) reveals that a 10 percent increase
in the bond yields still significantly increases the migration rate to Germany by 1.4 per-
cent. Recall that what we are obtaining here is a consistent estimate of what we consider
the main component from the continuation payoff associated with remaining in the origin
country: Vt+1(j). All other elements in Vt+1(j), corresponding to expectations in alternative
destinations, are controlled for by the auxiliary regressors, which are jointly significant. The
estimated elasticity of the bilateral migration rate to Germany with respect to unemployment
at origin is still in line with the that we obtained from the more parsimonious specification
reported in Column (2).
The last two columns in Table 4 add an additional variable (with its four lags) to the
previous specifications: the log of the GDP per capita in the origin countries. The results
are shown in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4. The estimated elasticities for the 10-year bond
yields variable is basically unaffected in both specifications compared to Columns (5) and
69This interpretation is further corroborated by the reduction of the F -test for the specification in Column
(4), which stands at 16.60, compared to Column (2).
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(6). However, there is some evidence that both the unemployment rate and the GDP per
capita at origin are proxying for the same concept of current economic conditions at origin.
While both variables are significant in the FE specification in Column (5), the coefficient
on the unemployment rate variable is significantly reduced with respect to specification (3):
from 0.53 to 0.40. The estimated elasticity of the GDP per capita variable stands at -0.83
in Column (6), and it is significant at the 5 percent confidence level. As happened with the
unemployment rate, multilateral resistance to migration unduly magnifies its estimated effect
in the traditional FE specification reported in Column (5), where the estimated elasticity
stands at -1.44.
5.2 Robustness checks
We present some relevant robustness checks on our results, where we (i) extend the sample
size to 30 countries, (ii) do not weight observations, (iii) we drop Estonia as bond yields
have been estimated for this country, (iv) we rely on alternative measures of population at
origin, and (v) we more fully control for the possible confounding effects of networks through
a richer structure of fixed effects. For all points (i) to (v) we report the FE and the CCE
estimates including the rate of unemployment at origin, 10-year bond yields and immigration
policy variables.
First, we test whether our results are robust if we expand our sample by adding Turkey
and Croatia in order to achieve the minimum number of countries suggested by Pesaran
(2006). As mentioned above, we add Turkey because it is one of the main traditional origins
for German immigration although it is only the fifth country by the size of total gross inflows
over our seven-year period (189,314 immigrants to Germany). Croatia is also a natural choice
for our extended sample, as it joined the EU, and hence the EEA, after the end of our period
of analysis on July 1, 2013, and it recorded 67,722 immigrants to Germany between 2006 and
2012. The results on this expanded 30-country sample are shown in Table 5. Columns (1)
and (2) present the FE and CCE specification, which are basically unchanged with respect
to our baseline specifications in Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4. The estimated elasticity
for the 10-year bond yields is slightly larger than in our baseline, but the difference is not
significant at conventional confidence levels.
We reran the model on the baseline sample without population weights in Columns (3)
and (4) in Table 5. The estimated coefficients are again barely different from our baseline
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in Table 4. Then, we also test what happens when we estimate both the FE and CCE
specifications dropping Estonia, the only country in our main sample for which we did not
have actual bond yields data and had to estimate them. As it could be expected, the
omission of a country that represents barely more than 0.3 percent of the total population
of the included origin countries has no impact whatsoever on the estimates. Columns (5)
and (6) from Table 5 are almost identical to specifications (3) and (4) from Table 4.
The first two specifications in Table 6 report the results that we obtain when using
population figures from EUROSTAT (2013c) to relate observed gross migration flows to
Germany to the size of the population at origin aged 15 to 49, which probably represents
the age range from which most recent migrants to Germany are drawn from. Columns (1)
and (2) reveal that this change in the definition of the dependent variable has no impact on
our estimates. In unreported results, we have also experimented with alternative definitions
of the denominator of the migration rate closer to the theoretical concept of those remaining
in the origin countries and interpolating monthly observations so as to obtain the same
frequency as in our migration data. The results remain virtually unchanged due to the fact
that most of the variation in the migration rate comes from the numerator independently of
the definition of the denominator.70
The other specifications in Table 6 include the interaction between the origin dummies
djk and dummies for sub-periods of our sample, whose length is respectively 42 and 21
months. This greatly reduces the variability that we use for identification, allowing us to
better control for the effects of time-varying migration networks at destination and other
potential time-varying confounders. Our estimates are robust to this richer structure of
fixed effects, whose most relevant effect is to reduce the size of the bias in the estimated
coefficient for bond yields in the FE specification.71
70Results available from the authors upon request.
71The magnitude of the estimated effect of the 2007 EU enlargement is reduced in size, as we use a more
limited number of months after the policy change to identify its effects; this reveals that the effects of the
policy change might have emerged gradually, although the FE estimates are likely to be still biased because
of multilateral resistance to migration.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the effects of the economic crisis that began in 2008 on migra-
tion flows from EEA countries to Germany, tackling the econometric challenges that arise
from the sequential model of migration that we developed from the seminal contribution of
Kennan and Walker (2011). We control for the confounding influence exerted by the future
attractiveness of alternative destination countries with the econometric approach proposed
by Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013), and we extend the usual definition of
location-specific utility to better account for the role of expectations in shaping the decision
to migrate.
We find evidence that economic conditions at origin and the expectations about their
evolution, proxied by the yields on 10-year government bonds, significantly influence the
scale of bilateral migration flows. The estimation of both effects is biased when we resort to
more restrictive estimation approaches, which are not consistent with the forward-looking
and path-dependent character of the decision to migrate, and the direction of the bias is
consistent with the predictions generated by the underlying RUM model of migration. This
confirms that variations in the future attractiveness of alternative destinations do play a
role in shaping current migration decisions, thus suggesting that, say, the crisis in Spain
contributes to explain not only the increase in Spanish migration, but also the surge in
Romanian and Bulgarian migration to Germany observed since 2006. This, in turn, implies
that the economic crisis played an important and subtle influence in reshaping the landscape
of international migration flows within Europe that goes beyond its direct effects on the
citizens of the countries that have been more severely affected.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics from the Eurobarometer surveys
worse personal job situation (percent)
Country Average St. dev. Lowest Highest Change
Austria 8.3 1.6 6 11 -3
Belgium 7.5 2.2 5 11 2
Bulgaria 11.5 2.7 8 17 -7
Cyprus 12.6 6.5 7 33 25
Czech Republic 12.4 3.0 8 18 8
Denmark 2.9 0.8 2 5 -1
Estonia 7.1 2.8 3 12 0
Finland 3.7 1.3 2 6 2
France 6.2 1.4 4 10 -1
Germany 7.5 2.2 4 12 -7
Greece 21.7 13.0 8 42 27
Hungary 26.7 6.0 16 37 11
Iceland 3.5 1.6 2 6 -
Ireland 12.0 5.2 4 20 14
Italy 15.9 3.7 11 22 11
Latvia 9.3 5.8 4 25 0
Lithuania 21.6 9.1 11 40 -4
Luxembourg 5.0 2.0 4 11 2
Netherlands 7.7 1.9 6 12 5
Poland 9.9 3.4 4 16 2
Portugal 23.4 7.1 14 38 16
Romania 14.9 5.6 8 26 5
Slovak Republic 13.7 3.4 9 20 3
Slovenia 11.1 3.4 6 18 9
Spain 10.2 4.1 5 18 12
Sweden 3.5 0.8 2 4 -1
United Kingdom 6.9 2.1 5 11 0
Notes: values are in percent; change reports the difference in percentage
points between the November 2012 and the April 2006 surveys; 14 obser-
vations for each country, except for Iceland (6 observations), as Iceland has
been covered by the Eurobarometer only since 2010.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from European Commission (various
issues).
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Table 2: Determinants of the expectations on your personal job situation
Dependent variable:
worse personal job situation
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Unemployment rate 0.526 0.267 0.193
[0.070]*** [0.074]*** [0.090]**
10-year bond yields 0.415 0.397
[0.056]*** [0.057]***
Gross domestic product -0.704
[0.489]
Adjusted R2 0.831 0.856 0.856
Observations 330 330 330
Countries 26 26 26
Surveys 14 14 14
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; standard errors
in brackets; the dependent variable is the share of respondents
who expect their personal job situation to worsen over the next
year; all variables are in natural logarithms.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from European Commis-
sion (various issues) and the data described in Section 3.2.2.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Average St. dev. Min Max Obs.
Migration rate (× 1,000) 0.083 0.12 0.001 0.89 2,352
Migration rate index 167.54 131.05 16.67 1,979.68 2,352
Unemployment rate 8.88 4.16 2.3 26.2 2,352
Unemployment rate index 113.64 49.31 42.24 343.18 2,352
Real GDP index 103.79 6.40 81.03 129.89 2,352
10-year bond yields 4.65 1.95 0.61 29.24 2,352
10-year bond yield index 120.23 51.64 24.62 812.22 2,352
Notes: monthly series on 28 countries over the period January 2006 - December
2012; all descriptive statistics are weighted by population at origin; all indices
are set to 100 in January 2006.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Statistisches Bundesamt (2013) and on the
data presented in Section 3.2.2.
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Table 4: Determinants of bilateral migration rates to Germany (2006-2012)
Dependent variable:
log of the bilateral migration rate to Germany
Specification
Model FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log unemployment rate 0.729 0.521 0.533 0.486 0.400 0.384
(4 lags) [0.021]*** [0.035]*** [0.019]*** [0.043]*** [0.022]*** [0.059]***
log 10-year bond yields 0.390 0.141 0.350 0.142
(4 lags) [0.015]*** [0.028]*** [0.015]*** [0.032]***
log GDP per capita -1.443 -0.830
(4 lags) [0.125]*** [0.350]**
2007 EU Enlargement 1.138 (included) 1.053 (included) 1.135 (included)
[0.038]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]***
2011 Free Mobility 0.172 (included) 0.135 (included) 0.231 (included)
[0.021]*** [0.018]*** [0.020]***
CCE Test (p-value) 33.71 (0.00) 16.60 (0.00) 12.01 (0.00)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin-month dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Auxiliary regressors no yes no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.980 0.995 0.985 0.995 0.986 0.995
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
Observations 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; standard errors in brackets; observations weighted by
population at origin; the coefficients on the independent variables are the long-run coefficients on four lags
of the variables; CCE specifications include the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent
variables interacted with origin fixed effects as auxiliary regressors; policy variables are included but not
identified because of perfect collinearity with the auxiliary regressors in the CCE specifications; the null
of the CCE test (F -test) is that the origin-specific coefficients of the cross-sectional averages included as
auxiliary regressors are jointly zero.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Statistisches Bundesamt (2013) and on the data presented in Section 3.2.2.
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Table 5: Determinants of bilateral migration rates to Germany, robustness checks
Dependent variable:
log of the bilateral migration rate to Germany
Specification
Adds Croatia and Turkey No population weights Drops Estonia
Model FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log unemployment rate 0.539 0.492 0.491 0.373 0.533 0.483
(4 lags) [0.018]*** [0.039]*** [0.024]*** [0.072]*** [0.019]*** [0.044]***
log 10-year bond yields 0.394 0.198 0.330 0.162 0.391 0.141
(4 lags) [0.015]*** [0.025]*** [0.020]*** [0.044]*** [0.015]*** [0.029]***
2007 EU Enlargement 1.090 (included) 1.177 (included) 1.054 (included)
[0.034]*** [0.049]*** [0.033]***
2011 Free Mobility 0.157 (included) 0.362 (included) 0.134 (included)
[0.019]*** [0.023]*** [0.019]***
CCE Test (p-value) 14.81 (0.00) 9.76 (0.00) 16.82 (0.00)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin-month dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Auxiliary regressors no yes no yes no yes
Weights yes yes no no yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.983 0.994 0.964 0.984 0.985 0.995
Countries 30 30 28 28 27 27
Observations 2,520 2,520 2,352 2,352 2,268 2,268
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; standard errors in brackets; observations weighted by
population at origin when noted; the coefficients on the independent variables are the long-run coefficients
on four lags of the variables; CCE specifications include the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and
independent variables interacted with origin fixed effects as auxiliary regressors; policy variables are included
but not identified because of perfect collinearity with the auxiliary regressors in the CCE specifications; the
null of the CCE test (F -test) is that the origin-specific coefficients of the cross-sectional averages included
as auxiliary regressors are jointly zero.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Statistisches Bundesamt (2013) and on the data presented in Section 3.2.2.
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Table 6: Determinants of bilateral migration rates to Germany, robustness checks (cont’d)
Dependent variable:
log of the bilateral migration rate to Germany
Specification
Population aged 15-49 Two sub-periods Four sub-periods
Model FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log unemployment rate 0.522 0.497 0.465 0.490 0.396 0.462
(4 lags) [0.019]*** [0.043]*** [0.021]*** [0.046]*** [0.028]*** [0.055]***
log 10-year bond yields 0.404 0.138 0.310 0.147 0.213 0.137
(4 lags) [0.015]*** [0.029]*** [0.015]*** [0.030]*** [0.019]*** [0.031]***
2007 EU Enlargement 1.043 (included) 0.821 (included) 0.730 (included)
[0.032]*** [0.028]*** [0.030]***
2011 Free Mobility 0.131 (included) 0.205 (included) 0.172 (included)
[0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.049]***
CCE Test (p-value) 17.17 (0.00) 6.66 (0.00) 2.82 (0.00)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin-month dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin-sub-period dummies no no yes yes yes yes
Auxiliary regressors no yes no yes no yes
Adjusted R2 0.985 0.995 0.991 0.995 0.994 0.995
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
Observations 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352 2,352
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; standard errors in brackets; observations weighted by
population at origin; the coefficients on the independent variables are the long-run coefficients on four lags
of the variables; CCE specifications include the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent
variables interacted with origin fixed effects as auxiliary regressors; policy variables are included but not
identified because of perfect collinearity with the auxiliary regressors in the CCE specifications; the null
of the CCE test (F -test) is that the origin-specific coefficients of the cross-sectional averages included as
auxiliary regressors are jointly zero.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Statistisches Bundesamt (2013) and on the data presented in Section 3.2.2.
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Appendix
A Further results from the Eurobarometer surveys
Table A.1: Determinants of expectations
Dependent variable:
worse life in general worse economic situation
in the country
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment rate 0.473 0.340 0.328 0.231 0.129 0.145
[0.072]*** [0.080]*** [0.097]*** [0.077]*** [0.087] [0.106]
10-year bond yields 0.214 0.2171 0.164 0.167
[0.061]*** [0.062]*** [0.066]** [0.068]**
Gross domestic product -0.115 0.153
[0.528] [0.575]
Adjusted R2 0.849 0.854 0.854 0.606 0.612 0.611
Observations 356 356 356 356 356 356
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26
Surveys 14 14 14 14 14 14
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; standard errors in brackets; the dependent variable in
specifications (1)-(3) is the share of respondents who expect their life in general to worsen over the
next year, and in specifications (4)-(6) the share of respondents who expect the economic situation
in their country to worsen over the next year; all variables are in natural logarithms.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from European Commission (various issues) and the data
described in Section 3.2.2.
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Table A.2: Determinants of expectations (cont’d)
Dependent variable:
worse household financial situation worse employment situation
in the country
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment rate 0.452 0.222 0.193 0.463 0.414 0.480
[0.065]*** [0.069]*** [0.084]*** [0.091]*** [0.095]*** [0.116]***
10-year bond yields 0.370 0.363 0.080 0.096
[0.052]*** [0.054]*** [0.072] [0.074]
Gross domestic product -0.272 0.632
[0.455] [0.629]
Adjusted R2 0.799 0.826 0.826 0.634 0.635 0.619
Observations 356 356 356 356 356 356
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26
Surveys 14 14 14 14 14 14
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; standard errors in brackets; the dependent variable
in specifications (1)-(3) is the share of respondents who expect their the financial situation of their
household to worsen over the next year, and in specifications (4)-(6) the share of respondents who
expect the employment situation in their country to worsen over the next year; all variables are in
natural logarithms.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from European Commission (various issues) and the data
described in Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 1: Gross flows from Romania to Germany and Spain, 2006-2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Statistisches Bundesamt (2013) and INE (various years).
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Figure 2: Gross inflows to Germany by country sample, 2006-2016
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Statistisches Bundesamt (2013).
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